The need to sustain funding for Afghanistan health system to prevent excess morbidity and mortality.

Background: The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, managed by the World Bank through a contracted-out instrument called Sehatmandi, financed health service delivery in Afghanistan, with substantial achievements in infant, child and maternal health. After the collapse of the Afghan Government on 15 August 2021, the health system has been on the brink of collapse. Aims: We assessed the use of basic health services and estimated excess mortality resulting from the interruption to healthcare funding. Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional study that compared health services utilization from June to September for 3 consecutive years, 2019, 2020 and 2021, using 11 output indicators reported by the health management and information system. We used the Lives Saved Tool, a linear mathematical model with input data from the Afghanistan Demographic Health Survey 2015, to calculate the additional maternal, neonatal and child mortality at 25%, 50%, 75% and 95% reduction in health coverage. Results: During August and September 2021, after the announced ban on financing, health service utilization decreased to a range of 7-59%. Family planning, major surgeries and postnatal care showed the greatest decreases. Uptake of child immunization showed one-third decrease. Sehatmandi provides around 75% of primary and secondary health services: pausing funds to this programme will result in additional 2862 maternal deaths, 15 741 neonatal deaths, 30 519 child deaths, and 4057 stillbirths. Conclusion: Sustaining the current level of health services delivery is crucial to avoid excess, preventable morbidity and mortality in Afghanistan.

Analysis of human resources for health in Afghanistan.

Background: Despite large-scale investment in health service delivery outsourcing, few studies have examined human resources for health (HRH) in Afghanistan. Aims: To review the HRH situation of outsourced healthcare services in Afghanistan and evaluate nongovernment organization (NGO) investments in the health workforce. Methods: Two questionnaires were used for data collection. One gathered information about the characteristics of HRH in 2020 and the other collected budgetary data for 2017-2020 to analyse budget allocation and expenditure by NGOs on the health workforce. Results: A total of 25 262 (65% male, 35% female) individuals were employed by NGOs in 31 provinces of Afghanistan. There was a critical shortage of personnel and a prevalence of gender imbalance across all provinces. Healthcare workers were mostly aged 26 to 30 years. Services were mostly provided by local NGOs and their scopes were not limited to outsourced projects. More than 75% of the budget of NGOs was allocated to the health workforce in 2017-2020, and more than 70% of allocations was spent on staff salaries, followed by other health workforce expenditure. Less than 5% was spent on capacity building. Conclusion: There is a gross shortage and large gender imbalance in the Afghanistan health workforce. It is essential to maintain and increase current financial and technical investments to ensure sustainability and enhance the fragile health system in Afghanistan.

Improving health service delivery in conflict-affected settings: Lessons from a nationwide strategic purchasing mechanism in Afghanistan.

BACKGROUND: Due to ongoing insecurity, the government of Afghanistan delivers health care to the country's population by contracting out service delivery to non-governmental organization service providers (SPs). In 2018, major changes to SP contracts were introduced, resulting in a new pay-for-performance service delivery model. This model, called "Sehatmandi", pays SPs based on the volume of 11 key services they provide. METHODS: A narrative review of Sehatmandi's key features is presented, as well as lessons learned during implementation. Counterfactual comparisons of service delivery data for 10 payment-related service indicators are made. The first comparison is between the rate of change in the volume of services delivered from 2018 to 2019 (ie, the first year of Sehatmandi implementation) relative to the rate change from 2017 to 2018 (ie, prior to the program). The second comparison is between the rate of change in the volume of services delivered in provinces under the pay-for-performance mechanism relative to provinces which were not financed using pay-for-performance. Time trends in non-payment service indicators and service quality are also examined. RESULTS: The increase in service volume in Sehatmandi provinces from 2018 to 2019 was higher than the increase from 2017 to 2018 for 8 out of 10 indicators. The median increase in the rate of change was 10 percentage points. Similar results were obtained when comparing pay-for-performance provinces to those not financed using pay-for-performance. Improvements were also observed for services that were not directly compensated by the pay-for-performance approach. Payment for service volume was not associated with reduced service quality. The narrative review suggests that the pay-for-performance system has stimulated more effective oversight of SPs by the government of Afghanistan and has incentivized innovative service delivery strategies by SPs. Sehatmandi may benefit from re-structuring its financial incentives to stimulate improved service quality and accelerate delivery of lagging services. CONCLUSIONS: The available evidence - though subject to some limitations - suggests that the introduction of a pay-for-performance system was associated with an expanded volume of service delivery in Afghanistan. This approach may be beneficial in other conflict-affected countries.